Reasoning about agents who may know other agents’ strategies in Strategy Logic
Sophia Knight (University of Minnesota, Duluth)
Abstract: In this talk I will discuss some new developments in Strategy Logic with imperfect information. Strategy Logic is concerned with agents' strategic abilities in multi-agent systems, and unlike ATL, treats strategies as first-class objects in the logic, independent from the agents. Thus, in imperfect information settings, Strategy Logic raises delicate issues, such as what agents know about one another's strategies. I will describe a new version of Strategy Logic that ensures that agents' strategies are uniform, and allows a formal description of their knowledge about each other's strategies.
game theorylogic in computer sciencemultiagent systemslogic
Audience: researchers in the topic
Series comments: Description: Seminar on all areas of logic
Organizer: | Wesley Calvert* |
*contact for this listing |