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SUMMARY:Sophia Knight (University of Minnesota\, Duluth)
DTSTART:20210225T190000Z
DTEND:20210225T200000Z
DTSTAMP:20260423T021311Z
UID:OLS/45
DESCRIPTION:Title: <a href="https://researchseminars.org/talk/OLS/45/">Rea
 soning about agents who may know other agents’ strategies in Strategy Lo
 gic</a>\nby Sophia Knight (University of Minnesota\, Duluth) as part of On
 line logic seminar\n\n\nAbstract\nIn this talk I will discuss some new dev
 elopments in Strategy Logic with imperfect information. Strategy Logic is 
 concerned with agents' strategic abilities in multi-agent systems\, and un
 like ATL\, treats strategies as first-class objects in the logic\, indepen
 dent from the agents. Thus\, in imperfect information settings\, Strategy 
 Logic raises delicate issues\, such as what agents know about one another'
 s strategies. I will describe a new version of Strategy Logic that ensures
  that agents' strategies are uniform\, and allows a formal description of 
 their knowledge about each other's strategies.\n
LOCATION:https://researchseminars.org/talk/OLS/45/
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