An Overview of Using Mechanism Design for Social Good

Abstract: In order to accurately predict an algorithm's outcome and quality when it interacts with participants who have a stake in the outcome, we must design it to be robust to strategic manipulation. This is the subject of algorithmic mechanism design, which borrows ideas from game theory and economics to design robust algorithms. In this talk, I will show how results from the theoretical foundations of algorithmic mechanism design can be used to solve problems of societal concern.

I will overview recent work in this area in many different applications — housing, labor markets, carbon license allocations, health insurance markets, and more — as well as discuss open problems and directions ripe for tools from both mechanism design and general TCS.

computational complexitycomputational geometrycryptography and securitydiscrete mathematicsdata structures and algorithmsgame theorymachine learningquantum computing and informationcombinatoricsinformation theoryoptimization and controlprobability

Audience: researchers in the topic

TCS+

Series comments: Description: Theoretical Computer Science

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