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SUMMARY:Kira Goldner (Columbia University)
DTSTART:20210526T170000Z
DTEND:20210526T180000Z
DTSTAMP:20260423T021007Z
UID:TCSPlus/27
DESCRIPTION:Title: <a href="https://researchseminars.org/talk/TCSPlus/27/"
 >An Overview of Using Mechanism Design for Social Good</a>\nby Kira Goldne
 r (Columbia University) as part of TCS+\n\n\nAbstract\nIn order to accurat
 ely predict an algorithm's outcome and quality when it interacts with part
 icipants who have a stake in the outcome\, we must design it to be robust 
 to strategic manipulation.  This is the subject of algorithmic mechanism d
 esign\, which borrows ideas from game theory and economics to design robus
 t algorithms.  In this talk\, I will show how results from the theoretical
  foundations of algorithmic mechanism design can be used to solve problems
  of societal concern.  \n\nI will overview recent work in this area in man
 y different applications — housing\, labor markets\, carbon license allo
 cations\, health insurance markets\, and more — as well as discuss open 
 problems and directions ripe for tools from both mechanism design and gene
 ral TCS.\n
LOCATION:https://researchseminars.org/talk/TCSPlus/27/
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