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SUMMARY:Inbal Talgam-Cohen (Technion – Israel Institute of Technology)
DTSTART:20220601T170000Z
DTEND:20220601T180000Z
DTSTAMP:20260423T021013Z
UID:TCSPlus/42
DESCRIPTION:Title: <a href="https://researchseminars.org/talk/TCSPlus/42/"
 >Algorithmic contract theory</a>\nby Inbal Talgam-Cohen (Technion – Isra
 el Institute of Technology) as part of TCS+\n\n\nAbstract\nAlgorithms incr
 easingly interact with strategic\, self-interested players\; their design 
 must take player incentives into account or risk being "gamed" and failing
  miserably. The algorithmic game theory literature traditionally focused o
 n "mechanisms" - algorithms that incentivize players to truthfully report 
 the input. In this talk we shift focus from mechanisms to "contracts"\, wh
 ich are concerned with the algorithm's output and players' incentives to c
 arry it out. The goal of this talk is to describe where we're at in formin
 g a new algorithmic theory of contract design.\n\nI will demonstrate how a
 lgorithmic approaches – in particular the approach of beyond worst-case 
 analysis – can shed light on a classic economic puzzle regarding simple 
 contracts. Within the realm of incentives and learning\, I will discuss ho
 w classifiers induce incentives and show a formal relation to contracts.\n
 \nBased on joint works with Tal Alon\, Magdalen Dobson\, Paul Duetting\, R
 on Lavi\, Ariel Procaccia\, Tim Roughgarden\, Elisheva Shamash and Jamie T
 ucker-Foltz.\n
LOCATION:https://researchseminars.org/talk/TCSPlus/42/
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