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SUMMARY:Mona Imanpoor Yourdshahy (Simon Fraser University)
DTSTART:20230323T223000Z
DTEND:20230323T233000Z
DTSTAMP:20260513T193637Z
UID:SFUOR/18
DESCRIPTION:Title: <a href="https://researchseminars.org/talk/SFUOR/18/">E
 ffects of Usage-Based Auto Insurance: A Dynamic Mechanism-Design Approach<
 /a>\nby Mona Imanpoor Yourdshahy (Simon Fraser University) as part of PIMS
 -CORDS SFU Operations Research Seminar\n\nLecture held in ASB 10908.\n\nAb
 stract\nUsage-Based Insurance (UBI) is one of the most recent innovations 
 by auto insurance companies that links the premium rates of customers to t
 heir actual driving performance. In this program\, drivers’ behaviours a
 re monitored directly while they drive. Then\, the insurance company uses 
 this data to offer discounts on the insurance premium to their customers. 
 This paper provides a theoretical model to capture the effects of this mon
 itoring technology on the auto insurance market. We formulate the underlyi
 ng insurance problem as a dynamic principal-agent model with hidden inform
 ation and hidden action. An agent (customer) privately knows his type that
  summarizes his ability as a driver and can exert an unobservable effort i
 n each period\, which affects his subsequent type. The principal (insurer)
  offers a long-term contract to the agent despite the fact that she observ
 es neither the type of the agent nor the actions he takes. We characterize
  the full history-dependent optimal contract for this dynamic adverse sele
 ction and moral hazard problem. To compute the optimal contract\, we devel
 op a general recursive formulation. The underlying system is a Markov deci
 sion process\, where the evolution of the state of the system (type of the
  customer) is endogenous\, as it depends on his hidden action in the previ
 ous period. We develop a dynamic programming algorithm to examine the mode
 l analytically and explore structural results about the optimal contract. 
 The model results lead to important and interesting managerial insights fo
 r firms who may consider offering UBI programs. The study sheds light on h
 ow to design the contract to manage a UBI program\, the extent to which a 
 UBI policy can outperform a traditional policy\, and how the potential gai
 ns depend on the demographics of the target market.\n
LOCATION:https://researchseminars.org/talk/SFUOR/18/
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