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SUMMARY:Vanessa Teague (Stafford Tavares Lecture) (Thinking Cybersecurity 
 and Australian National University)
DTSTART:20201022T000000Z
DTEND:20201022T010000Z
DTSTAMP:20260422T195238Z
UID:SAC2020/1
DESCRIPTION:Title: <a href="https://researchseminars.org/talk/SAC2020/1/">
 What’s so hard about Internet voting?</a>\nby Vanessa Teague (Stafford T
 avares Lecture) (Thinking Cybersecurity and Australian National University
 ) as part of Selected Areas in Cryptography 2020\n\n\nAbstract\nThe first 
 papers about electronic voting were written only a year or two after the i
 nvention of public key cryptography. It all seemed so simple: some voting 
 codes\, a mixnet or two\, and we could have private and verifiable remote 
 voting for everyone.\n\nBut the more we think about elections as a specifi
 c engineering problem\, the more subtle problems appear. How do we ensure 
 that people can’t sell their votes or be coerced into voting in a partic
 ular way? What if the voter’s computer sends a different vote from the o
 ne the voter wanted? How can independent auditors test for mistakes or man
 ipulation? If the protocol assumes a separation of powers or a distributio
 n of trust\, how do we make those independence assumptions true in practic
 e? What if we discover after the election that there was a bug in the math
 s?\n\nI’ll survey the history of good ideas in the literature\, and expl
 ain why recent examinations of real systems have identified problems that 
 researchers didn’t even consider.\n\nWe’re learning something about de
 mocracy and security as we go\, but unfortunately we’re mostly learning 
 about the fragility of our democratic systems and the limitations of our c
 lever cryptographic solutions.\n\nI’ll conclude with some positive devel
 opments\, including Risk-Limiting Audits and pollsite e-voting systems\, a
 nd why I think those directions are more promising than paperless Internet
  voting.\n\nVanessa Teague is the CEO of Thinking Cybersecurity and Associ
 ate Prof (Adj.) in the Research School of Computer Science at the Australi
 an National University. Her research focuses primarily on cryptographic me
 thods for achieving security and privacy\, particularly for issues of publ
 ic interest such as election integrity and the protection of government da
 ta. She was part of the team (with Chris Culnane and Ben Rubinstein) who d
 iscovered the easy re-identification of doctors and patients in the Medica
 re/PBS open dataset released by the Australian Department of Health. She h
 as co-designed numerous protocols for improved election integrity in e-vot
 ing systems\, and co-discovered serious weaknesses in the cryptography of 
 deployed e-voting systems in New South Wales\, Western Australia and Switz
 erland. She lives and works on Wurundjeri land in Southeastern Australia (
 near Melbourne).\n
LOCATION:https://researchseminars.org/talk/SAC2020/1/
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