BEGIN:VCALENDAR
VERSION:2.0
PRODID:researchseminars.org
CALSCALE:GREGORIAN
X-WR-CALNAME:researchseminars.org
BEGIN:VEVENT
SUMMARY:Kameryn Williams (Bard College at Simon's Rock)
DTSTART:20231005T180000Z
DTEND:20231005T190000Z
DTSTAMP:20260423T021310Z
UID:OLS/128
DESCRIPTION:Title: <a href="https://researchseminars.org/talk/OLS/128/">In
 terpretations and bi-interpretations in second-order arithmetic</a>\nby Ka
 meryn Williams (Bard College at Simon's Rock) as part of Online logic semi
 nar\n\n\nAbstract\nThe property of tightness\, introduced by Visser\, give
 s a notion of semantic completeness for a theory. Specifically\, a theory 
 T is tight if any two distinct extensions of T cannot be bi-interpretable.
  Important foundational theories like PA and ZF are tight. Consequently in
 terpretations of extensions of these theories must lose information. For e
 xample\, ZF + ¬AC can interpret ZFC by restricting to the constructible u
 niverse while ZFC can interpret ZF + ¬AC via\, essentially\, forcing. But
  these interpretations destroy information about the original universe\, a
 nd the tightness of ZF implies there are no alternative interpretations wh
 ich avoid this problem.\n\nEnayat asked whether the full strength of theor
 ies like ZF or full second-order arithmetic is necessary for the tightness
  results and conjectured that this property can be used to give a characte
 rization of these theories. Phrased in the contrapositive: must it be that
  any strict subtheory of these theories admits distinct\, bi-interpretable
  extensions? Alfredo Roque Freire and I investigated this question for sub
 systems of second-order arithmetic\, providing some evidence for Enayat’
 s conjecture. We showed that if you restrict the comprehension axiom to fo
 rmulae of a bounded complexity then you can find two distinct yet bi-inter
 pretable extensions of the theory. The main idea of the construction\, not
  uncommon for work in logic\, goes back to an old observation by Mostowski
 . Namely\, while truth is not arithmetically definable\, it is definable o
 ver the arithmetical sets.\n
LOCATION:https://researchseminars.org/talk/OLS/128/
END:VEVENT
END:VCALENDAR
