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SUMMARY:Armajac Raventós Pujol (Universidad Autónoma de Madrid - Spain)
DTSTART:20230303T160000Z
DTEND:20230303T170000Z
DTSTAMP:20260423T022921Z
UID:GEOTOP-A/37
DESCRIPTION:Title: <a href="https://researchseminars.org/talk/GEOTOP-A/37/
 ">Simplicial complexes and the index lemma: A pathway to reach agreements 
 fairly</a>\nby Armajac Raventós Pujol (Universidad Autónoma de Madrid - 
 Spain) as part of GEOTOP-A seminar\n\n\nAbstract\nAggregating individual p
 references is a fundamental problem in democracy:\nHow can we take collect
 ive decisions fairly based on individual preferences? Arrow's impossibilit
 y theorem (1951) proves that it is not possible to do it when we assume so
 me apparently mild conditions. Fortunately\, in some cases\, aggregation i
 s possible when the domain of individual preferences is restricted. That i
 s\, when voters can only report some preferences\, good aggregation rules 
 exist. However\, no theorem characterizes the domains in which aggregation
  is possible\, and the\nproblem remains open.\n\nDespite the Arrovian mode
 l being purely combinatorial\, Baryshnikov (1993) used simplicial complexe
 s and homology to prove Arrow's theorem and exposed a conjecture which cha
 racterized restricted domains through homology groups. The main drawback o
 f using homology is that it is not affordable for most of the social scien
 tists. Therefore\, instead of homology\, we have used combinatorial topolo
 gy tools such as the Index Lemma (the combinatorial counterpart to Poincar
 e's Lemma) to tackle the problem. First\, we have proved the Arrow's impos
 sibility theorem\, showing that combinatorial topology is helpful for our 
 purposes.\n\nSecond\, we have characterized the domains allowing aggregati
 on rules for the base case of two voters and three candidates. Our charact
 erization proves that homology groups are not enough to characterize such 
 domains. Our result gives us hope to obtain a general characterization of 
 the good domains for aggregating preferences. Moreover\, it could be imple
 mented computationally\, making it handled by practitioners in politics an
 d economics.\n
LOCATION:https://researchseminars.org/talk/GEOTOP-A/37/
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